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A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR MEMBERS 
OF PARLIAMENT? 
Christopher Finlayson· 
The zntegrity of a government is largely judged by the conduct of its members. In recent times, it 
could be argued, that this llas been wanting. The author argues tllat this is in part due to the lack of 
clarity in the rules of conduct applying to members of Parliament, and the lack of sanctions (and 
corresponding lack of adherence) to those rttles which do exist. After examining the approach taken 
by the Ontario, Canadian and United Kingdom legislatures, a statutory code of conduct based on 
the Ontario model is advocated for New Zealand. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is to consider whether the time has come in New Zealand for 
a code of conduct for Members of Parliament (MPsl which could also incorporate a register 
of members' mterests (including liabilities). The article will consider the ex1sting ethical 
requirements in New Zealand for members of the Executive and examine the Canadian 
position, in particular legislation recently passed in Ontario, the Members' Integrity Act 
1994.1 Brief mention will also be made of the position in England where the House of 
Commons has adopted a code of conduct and a register of members' interests. Finally the 
article will consider whether there is a case for enactment of legislation along the lines of 
the Ontario precedent or whether a self regulating code of conduct is adequate. 
II THE NEW ZEALAND POSITION 
The current New Zealand position is inadequate. There is currently no code of conduct 
for MPs. There are. however. certain statutory provisions dealing with bribery and 
corruption of both Ministers and MPs. Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 
also require MPs to take certain steps in the event of a conflict of interest. In addition, the 
Cabinet Office Manual establishes guidelines for members of the Executive. 
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The Crimes Act 1961 contains certain provisions relating to bribery and corruption. 
Section 102 provides that any member of the Executive who corruptly accepts or obtains 
any bribe is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years, and anyone who 
tries to bribe a Minister is liable for a term of imprisonment not exceeding seven years. 
Section 103 is in very similar terms and relates to MPs. An MP is liable to imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding seven years who corruptly accepts or obtains any bribe, and anyone 
endeavouring to bribe an MP is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three 
years. Strangely, no-one shall be prosecuted for an offence against either section without 
the leave of a High Court judge first being obtained, and any person whom it is intended 
to prosecute shall first have an opportunity to be heard against the application. It seems 
singularly inappropriate that any Minister or MP charged with corruption should first 
have an opportunity of explaining himself or herself before any prosecution is commenced. 
No similar opportunity is given to members of the judiciary charged with corruption, nor 
to those about to be charged with a multitude of other serious offences." 
The Standing Orders of the House of Representatives' state that a member must declare 
a pecuniary interest which is defined as follows: 
168 Pecuniary interests 
(1) A pecuniary interest is a direct financial benefit that might accrue to a member 
personally, or to any trust, company or other business entity in which the member 
holds an appreciable interest, as a result of the outcome of the House's consideration of 
a particular item of business. 
(2) A pecuniary interest-
(a) includes a pecuniary interest held by a member's spouse or domestic partner 
or by any child of the member who is wholly or mainly dependent on the 
member for support, but 
(b) does not include any interest held by a member or any other person as one of a 
class of persons who belong to a profession, vocation or other calling or who 
hold public offices or an interest held in common with the public. 
The Speaker will make a final decision on any dispute as to whether a member has a 
pecuniary interest. Any member who fails to disclose a pecuniary interest before 
See ss 100 and I 0 l of the Crimes Act 1961. 
Standing Orders of the House of Representatives. New Zealand, 1996 (brought into force 20 February 1996 
and amended 22 August 1996). 
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participating in the consideration of any item of business commits a contempt of the 
House.4 
The Cabinet Office Manual relates only to Ministers (both in and outside Cabinet) and 
to Parliamentary Under-Secretaries. The purpose of the guidelines is to protect the 
integrity of the decision-making process of executive government by: 5 
• placing on record those personal interests which might be seen to influence 
decision-making by Ministers and Parliamentary Under-Secretaries; 
• requiring Ministers and Parliamentary Under-Secretaries to avoid situations from 
which they gain remuneration or other advantage from information acquired only 
by reason of their office; and 
• reinforcing the premise that holding office as a Minister or Parliamentary Under-
Secretary is expected to be a full-time occupation. 
In order to fulfil their duty, Ministers and Parliamentary Under-Secretaries are 
expected to devote their time and talent to carrying out their official business, both as 
members of the Executive and as MPs representing their constituents.6 The guidelines 
make it clear that holding office is regarded as a full-time occupation and is remunerated 
as such. It is not permissible for a Minister or Parliamentary Under-Secretary to accept any 
additional payment for doing anything that could be regarded as part of his or her normal 
portfolio responsibility. Accepting payment for any other activities requires the prior 
approval of the Prime Minister.7 
Conflicts of interest are dealt with in some detail. Ministers and Parliamentary Under-
Secretaries must ensure that no conflict exists or appears to exist between their public duty 
and their private interests. The guidelines illustrate ways in which a conflict of interest 
may arise both in individual performance of their portfolio responsibilities and as 
members of Cabinet. The guidelines provide that Ministers "must conduct themselves at 
all times in the knowledge that their role is a public one; appearances of propriety can be 
as important as actual conflicts of interest in establishing what is acceptable behaviour."R 
Within two months of appointment to office, all Ministers and Parliamentary Under-
Standing Order 399. 
Cabinet Office Manual, (Cabinet Office, Wellington 1996) para 2.75. 
Above n 5, para 2.76. 
Above n 5, para 2.76. 
Above n 5, para 2.77. 
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Secretaries must lodge with the Registrar of Ministers' Interests (who is also Secretary of 
Cabinet)9 a schedule of the following items: 10 
as at 31 December 
remunerated directorships and other employment; 
ii substantial minority or controlling interest in a business enterprise or professional 
practice; 
iii minority ownership of company shares of beneficial interest in a trust; 
iv ownership of all real property; 
v holding of mortgage or debt instruments. 
A description of the business activity under (i)-(iii) is to be given unless the businesses 
concemed are listed as public companies. 
for the previous year 
(applicable after a full year in office and annually thereafter): 
overseas visits not paid for personally, or by immediate family members, or from New 
Zealand public funds (the countries visited are to be listed, together with the purpose 
of the visit, a note of who met the costs and confirmation of the Prime Minister's prior 
approval); 
ii gifts received as a Minister or Parliamentary Under-Secretary during the year which 
have an estimated value of over NZ $500 (type of gift, and its source); 
iii payments received for any outside activities (receipt of the Prime Minister's prior 
approval must be confirmed). 
This register of interests is tabled by the Prime Minister in the House each year. The 
most recent register of Ministers' interests and assets was dated 31 January 1997.11 One 
Minister recorded a nil return while several other Ministers appeared to own virtually 
nothing. This register may be a start on the road to accountability but it is quite inadequate 
when compared with registers in other countries. Indeed the register has gaping holes. For 
example, there is no requirement for members of the Executive to list their liabilities. So, 
for example, a Minister need not disclose liabilities arising out of a judgment being entered 
Currently Marie Shroff. 
10 Above n 5, para 2.78. 
11 Register of Ministers' Interests and Assets as at 31 January 1997. 
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against him or her. So if, hypothetically, a Minister had a liability to pay damages to 
someone he or she had defamed, and some third party paid the damages for that Minister, 
there would be no obligation for the Minister to disclose whether he or she was helped in 
this regard and, if so, by whom. At the very least, the following information concerning 
liabilities should be contained in the register: 
• Debts owed by the Minister which are secured by mortgage or charge; 
• Persons to whom debts are owed and assets on which debts are secured; 
• Unsecured debts; 
• The person or persons to whom unsecured debts are owed; 
• Liabilities the Minister expects he or she will be obliged to meet within the period of 
6 months beginning from the date of the statement; 
• The persons to whom the Minister expects to be obliged to pay money during the 
period of 6 months beginning on the date of the statement in discharge of liabilities; 
• Debts or liabilities of the Minister discharged by a third party. 
The Cabinet Office Manual contains very detailed requirements about declarations of 
interest where a conflict is likely to arise.12 A declaration will always be necessary if a 
Minister or Parliamentary Under-Secretary has a direct financial interest. A declaration is 
not requirec;l for an interest held as one of a class of persons or held in common with the 
public. The example given is that of education issues where the Minister has school age 
children.n Ministers and Parliamentary Under-Secretaries are also subject to the Standing 
Orders referred to above. 14 
The Manual acknowledges that the exchange of gifts during official government visits 
is an accepted practice.15 Ministers and Parliamentary Under-Secretaries may retain gifts if 
the estimated value is under NZ $500.00. Gifts which exceed that value may be retained 
while in office but must be relinquished on giving up office unless the express permission 
of the Prime Minister to retain them is given. Presumably the gifts given to Ministers and 
Parliamentary Under Secretaries in 1997 were not worth retaining or the exchange of gifts 
has now ceased to be an accepted practice, because in the latest register only the former 
Prime Minister (J B Bolger) listed any gifts. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Above n 5, para 2.80-2.82. 
Above n 5, para 2.80. 
Above n 5, para 2.82. 
Above n 5, para 2.83. 
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Finally, the. Cabinet guidelines provide guidance on outside activities. In order to keep 
the public informed about important issues of the day, Ministers and Parliamentary 
Under-Secretaries are expected to speak at conferences or other gatherings. In such a 
circumstance, the government is expected to meet expenses and no fee is expected or 
accepted. If any fee is offered and approved by the Prime Minister, it must be declared in 
that person's schedule of interests. However it is expected that unsolicited payments 
should be returned, or where fees are offered they may, with the agreement of the Prime 
Minister, be donated directly to a recognised charity. 16 
Rather strangely there is a reference to product endorsement. No Minister or 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary is permitted to endorse on televisiOn or m other media any 
product or service.17 They may, however, appear on television to endorse themselves and 
their party in a party political advertisement. Ministers may not take any active part in day 
to day management or routine operation of any business enterprise as it is expected that 
they are required to devote their time and talent to official business. Given these 
guidelines, it is not clear how John Banks MP, when Minister of Tourism, could have 
conducted his Sunday show on Radio Pacific. However, provided no conflict of interest 
arises, there is nothing preventing a Minister or Parliamentary Under-Secretary from 
continuing to retain a certificate to practise law. Nor is there a requirement to dissolve any 
professional partnership or dispose of a business.18 Ministers may also continue to advise 
in relation to family trusts or similar matters of personal interest."' 
The public interest is partially served by the present regime but it is inadequate and, in 
relation to the register of Ministers' interests and assets, fails to disclose important 
information like liabilities. As has already been mentioned, however, there are at least 
some requirements for Ministers. 31 
The real cause for concern is that in New Zealand there is no disclosure framework for 
MPs other than Ministers nor is there any code of conduct or register of members' 
interests. The behaviour over the last 12 months of certain MPs would appear to justify at 
least a very careful inquiry about whether a code of conduct should be established. The MP 
for Eastern Bay of Plenty (A Ryall) recently argued in favour of a register of members' 
interests. He contended that there are three main arguments in favour of a reg1ster of 
)O 
l7 
31 
Above n 5. paras 2.85-2.88. 
Above n 5, para 2.89. 
Above n 5. para 2.91. 
Above n 5. para 2.91. 
Above n 5. 
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members' interests.21 First, to help restore public confidence in the political system. Second, 
to enable the media and the public to attach due weight to the views of the member. Third, 
to protect members from claims and criticisms of self interest. Similar points have been 
made by the Leader of the Opposition and even the former Prime Minister, Mr Bolger, 
who indicated he would not be averse to a code of conduct for MPs Responding in the 
House to a question on the subject from the Leader of the Opposition, following the Tuku 
Morgan "cash for interviews" affair, Mr Bolger said that he saw merit in the idea of 
developing fuller guidance for the conduct of Members of Parliament.. 22 
In October 1997 the Government Administration Committee of the House of 
Representatives sought the authority of the House to undertake an inquiry into some of 
these questions. 23 The terms of reference proposed by the Committee for the inquiry were 
to consider the relationship between the role of members and their outside interests, 
including the following: 24 
• The need, if any, for a Code of Conduct for MPs; 
• The need, if any, for a register of members' interests; 
• The form, scope and content of any Register of Members' Interests. 
In its report to the House, the Committee acknowledged that this work could also be 
undertaken by the Standing Orders Committee but thought that committee would benefit 
from another committee also looking at these issues. Furthermore, the Committee 
submitted it was a timely inquiry of fundamental importance to the House. 
The Committee emphasised in its report the desirability of investigating the need for a 
code of conduct which would encompass a wider range of issues than simply the private 
interests of MPs. The Committee said that: 25 
21 
Z1 
ZJ 
24 
It could extend to the professional conduct and behaviour of Members. There exists a 
compelling case for work to be done m this area. Many new Members, when they enter 
Parliament (especially those that arrived in such large numbers following the last general 
"MPs Should be Required to Disclose Financial Affairs". New Zealand Herald. Auckland, New Zealand. 9 
July 1997. !5. 
NZPD Questions for oral answer on Tuesday, 10 June 1997,2175. 
Special report of the Government Administration Committee Seeking Authority from the House to 
Undertake an Inquiry into the Relationship Between the Role of Members of Parliament and their Outside 
Interests, presented to the House of Representatives. October 1997 (L5B). 
Above n 23, 4. 
Above n 23. 4. 
173 
174 (1998) 28 VUWLR 
election) expect there to be some form of job description. As there is none, many seek guidance 
in an ad hoc way concerning the norms and rules of conduct and behaviour that are 
appropriate in and outside the House. 
The report of the Government Administration Committee investigated the position in 
the British House of Commons and Australia. While the House of Commons has a code of 
conduct applicable to its members,16 the Australian House of Representatives. like its New 
Zealand counterpart, does not have such a code.27 
The Committee also considered the need for a register of members' interests to act as a 
deterrent against improper behaviour on the part of members, to restore public confidence 
in the political system, to cope with the advent of mixed member proportional 
representation (MMP) and to facilitate the general desire for more openness and 
transparency with regard to political processes. It referred to the guidelines to which 
Ministers are subject, and said there were a number of advantages which might flow from 
the establishment of a register of members' interests including providing a check against 
corruption and protecting members against charges of self interest. It acknowledged, 
however, that such a register may prove overly intrusive and act as a disincentive to those 
considering life in politics.28 The scope of a register was not discussed in any detail, 
although reference was made to a statement in the House by Mr Ryall, MP, who suggested 
the register should detail the following financial information: 
• Shareholdings, trusts, real estate, business directorships and partnerships. 
• Substantial sources of income. 
• Gifts, sponsored travel and entertainment, memberships of organisations. 
• Liabilities. 
• Financial interests of spouses. 
The report also referred to overseas experience and noted that approximately 37 
parliaments throughout the Commonwealth have in place measures akin to registers of 
members' interests. ~ 
~ 
However there are detailed requirements about disclosure of Members' interests in the Australian House of 
Representatives. See further Standing Order 28A of the Standing Orders of the House of Representatives, 
Australia, published as Appendix B to the Special Report of the Government Administration Committee 
presented to the New Zealand House of Representatives in 1997, above n 23. 
Above n 26. 9. 
Above n 26, 9. 
See also G Carney Conflict of Interest: A Commonwealth Study of Members of Parliament, Legal Division, 
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The report concluded that New Zealand had recently undergone a fundamental 
political reform in the shape of MMP and that there was a desire on the part of many 
politicians and the public for certain standards and rules to be more clearly identified, and 
this could warrant the creation of a code of conduct for parliamentarians:l' 
Ill THE ONTARIO POSITION 
The Members' Integrity Act 1994/1 which came into force on 6 October 1995, is 
comprehensive yet concise legislation applying to all members of the Ontario Legislative 
Assembly. There are also specific additional guidelines for Executive members. The Act's 
key features are: first, Ontario chose to legislate in this area, rather than create a self-
imposed code of conduct for its elected members; second, an Integrity Commissioner is 
responsible for overseeing the Act's administration. Though an officer of the Assembly, the 
Commissioner is considered to be a more separate and independent party than someone 
appointed from the Assembly; third, the Act and therefore the Commissioner oversees the 
conduct of all elected members, including those in the Executive. 32 
It is not entirely clear why Ontario chose to deal with this subject by way of legislation 
rather than a self regulating code. The legislation received all three readings and the Royal 
Assent within 24 hours, and there is nothing in the Hansard of the Legislative Assembly to 
indicate why legislation was preferred to a code.33 The Act was said simply to put into 
effect recommendations from the then Conflict of Interest Commissioner, Justice Gregory 
Evans, who was authorised to administer the former Members' Conflict of Interest Act. 
Justice Evans had reviewed the workings of the earlier legislation and worked with legal 
counsel representing all three parties in the Legislative Assembly to draft the bill. 31 The 
purpose of the amendments was said to broaden the scope of the Act to deal with 
parliamentary tradition as well as conflict of interest in the economic sense. In moving the 
3) 
31 
3l 
report prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat, December 1992. This is a comparative study of conflict 
of interest legislation and guidelines within the Commonwealth in relation to MPs and was commissioned 
by the Commonwealth Secretariat for the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in 1988. Mr Carney is 
Associate Professor of Law at Bond University, Queensland. Australia. 
Above n 23. II. The Committee suggested its work could inform the Standing Orders Committee when that 
committee comes to consider amendments to the Standing Orders. 
Formerly the Members' Conflict of Interest Act 1988. 
The first Ontario Commissioner was the Hon Gregory T Evans and, after some partisan debate within the 
Provincial Assembly, a new Commissioner, the Hon Robert C Rutherford, has now been appointed. 
The full debate is contained in the Official Report of Debates (Hansard) in the Legislative Assembly of 
Ontario (3rd Session, 35th Parliament) Thursday 8 December 1994, 8453, 8459-8515. 
Above n 33, 8453: the speech of the Hon Brian A Charlton, Chair of the Management Board of Cabinet and 
Government House Leader in introducing the Bill. 
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first reading, the Hon Brian A Charlton said that it was hoped the amendments would 
clarify members' responsibilities and "take the partisan political wrangling out of conflict 
of interest issues". 20 
The first of four points in the preamble to the Members' Integrity Act 1994 states: 
"It is desirable to provide greater certainty in the reconciliation of the private interests and 
public duties of members of the Legislative Assembly, recognising the following principles: 
1 The Assembly as a whole can represent the people of Ontario most effectively if its 
members have experience and knowledge in relation to many aspects of life in Ontario 
and if they can continue to be active in their own communities, whether in business, in 
the practice of a profession or otherwise. 
This first principle is very important and deserves close consideration. It emphasises 
the need for politicians to have experience and knowledge about the outside world and to 
continue to be active in their communities. A common complaint made about politics both 
here and elsewhere is that the political class has narrowed increasingly in recent years and 
that this should be a source of major concern. This concern was expressed very well by the 
former British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, now Lord Hurd of Westwell, when he 
said about Westminster: ?6 
35 
. h 
40 years ago there was no ladder which went upwards from university or school directly into 
national politics. In practice, a young man or woman interested in politics had to go and do 
something else for 15 years before they could seriously be considered as an MP. That has 
changed. The palace of Westminster is thronged with eager young men and women who have 
done nothing but politics all their lives. The highly professional politician is particularly 
vulnerable to the single issue and the pressure groups. They have not learned in practical 
work-a-day careers how to balance conflicting interests before they reach a decision. The 
number of MPs with outside experience who could provide a counter-weight to the more 
professional politicians has greatly reduced, even in my political lifetime. This narrowing of 
experience also threatens to unbalance the relationship between Ministers and civil servants. A 
Minister should complement the analytical skills of the permanent officials. He should not be 
an official with an ideology. 
Above n 33, 8453 . 
Douglas Hurd, "The Whig Illusion". Prospect, London, England, February 1997, 3. (Also available at 
[http//www.prospect-magazine.eo.uk/highlights/whig_illusionlindex.]). 
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Lord Hurd also referred to the report by Lord Nolan on standards in public life37 and 
contended that quite unwittingly as a result of that report, the House of Commons may be 
moved further in the wrong direction: 38 
If as a matter of principle we insist on full time MPs - in order to avoid the problem of sleaze 
associated with outside interests - then we are consenting to this narrowing of the political 
class. Politicians will get more like civil servants and, perhaps, vice versa. I would greatly 
prefer to see a substantial minority of the House of Commons spending part of their time on 
outside activity and bringing to the House of Commons, under strict rules and with total 
transparency, up to date insights and experience from the real world. 
The same dangerous developments which Lord Hurd identified as happening in 
Westminster are also occurring in Wellington. The political class is starting to narrow in 
this country notwithstanding the recent change to New Zealand's electoral system and the 
enlargement of the House of Representatives. The issue is not whether there are more 
women and minorities represented in Parliament, but whether there are more experienced 
people who are leaders in commerce, the professions and other walks of life who can make 
a real contribution to public life. If anything Parliament has less of these types of people 
than ever, and more MPs who fall into the category of professional politicians. It seems 
contrary to experience and commonsense to accept that someone who makes his or her 
career as a full time politician spending other people's money and dictating rules is really 
capable of serving the public good or the national interest. 
The first part of the Ontario legislation contains provisions which apply to all members 
of the Assembly. There are specific provisions dealing with conflicts of interest, the use 
and communication of insider information, the wielding of influence so as to further a 
member's private interest or improperly further another person's private interest.}} There 
are also specific requirements about gifts and their disclosure (including the treatment of 
such benefits as travel points);«! rules regarding Government contracts with members; 41 
and finally, a detailed procedure which is required to be followed in the case of conflicts of 
interest. A member of the Assembly who has reasonable grounds to believe that he or she 
has a conflict of interest in a matter which is before the Assembly or the Executive Council 
37 
38 
40 
41 
First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life ( 1995) Cm 2850. 
Above n 36. 3. On professional politicians and their dubious contribution to the public good. see also P 
Johnson A History of the Modern World, fWeidenfield and Nicolson, London, 1983) 729. 
Sections 3 and 4. 
Section 6. 
Section 7. 
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is required to disclose the general nature of the conflict and withdraw from the meeting 
without voting or participating in the consideration of the matter. 42 
Given the first principle in the preamble, section 9 is significant. It provides: 
9 Nothing is this Act prohibits a member of the Assembly who is not a member of the 
Executive Council from, (a) engaging in employment or in the practice of a profession; 
(b) receiving fees for providing professional services under the Legal Aid Act; (c) 
engaging in the management of a business carried on by a Corporation; (d) carrying on 
a business through a partnership or sole proprietorship; (e) holding or trading in 
securities, stocks, futures and commodities; (f) holding shares or an interest in any 
corporation, partnership, syndicate, cooperative or similar commercial enterprise; (g) 
being a director or parh1er or holding an office, other than an office that a member may 
not hold under another Act. 
Current and former members of the Executive Council (Ministers) are held to an even 
higher standard than regular MPs. Ministers are required to follow certain rules of conduct 
even after their term in office has expired. 43 
Provisions within the Act govern a number of aspects of a Minister's life. These include 
a prohibition on outside activities (including the practice of a profession, management of a 
business or holding a directorship or office); a restriction on investments (a member may 
not hold or trade in securities, stocks, futures or commodities); partnerships and sole 
proprietorships (a member may not carry on business through a partnership or sole 
proprietorship); or even acquisition of land (a member shall not, directly or indirectly, 
acquire an interest in real property, except for residential or recreational use by the 
member or a person who belongs to his or her family). A member may, however, entrust 
his or her assets to one or more trustees on terms which shall be approved by an officer of 
the Assembly known as the Integrity Commissioner.* This person is critical to the 
successful operation of the Act. He or she shall be appointed for a term of five years by the 
Lieutenant Governor of Ontario. There are a number of routine provisions in the Act 
requiring the Commissioner to report annually to the Office to the Speaker. That report 
may summarise advice given by the Commissioner, but shall not disclose any confidential 
information which could identify the person concerned. The Commissioner also has the 
42 Section 8. 
Section 18. 
44 Sections 10-17. 
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power to provide opinions and recommendations on request or, at his or her initiative, 
conduct inquiries. 45 
There are a number of restrictions applicable to former members of the Executive 
Council. For example, during the 12 months after the date a member has ceased to hold 
office, he or she may not accept a contract or benefit which is awarded, approved or 
granted by the Executive Council, one of its members or an employee of the Ministry. A 
former member also may not take part in ongoing transactions for negotiations which 
began while he or she held office. Anyone doing so is guilty of an offence and is liable, on 
conviction, to a fine of not more than $50,000. '*" 
The third part of the Act deals with the all important question of disclosure. Within 60 
days of being elected and thereafter once a year on a date to be established by the 
Commissioner, every member must file a private disclosure statement which shall: 47 
46 
47 
(a) Identify the assets and liabilities of the member and his or her spouse and minor 
children, and state the value of the assets and liabilities; 
(b) State any income the member and his or her spouse and minor children have received 
during the preceding 12 months or are entitled to receive during the next 12 months, 
and indicate the source of the income; 
(c) State all benefits the member, his or her spouse and minor children, and any private 
company in which any of them has an interest, have received during the preceding 12 
months or are entitled to receive during the next 12 months as a result of a contract 
with the Government of Ontario, and describe the subject matter and nature of the 
contract; 
(d) If the private disclosure statement mentions a private company: 
(i) include any information about the company's activities and sources of income 
that the member is able to obtain by making reasonable inquiries, and 
(ii) state the names of any other companies that are its affiliates, as determined 
under subsections 1(2)(6) of the Securities Act; 
(e) List all corporations and other organisations in which the member is an officer or 
director or has a similar position; and 
Section 31. Note that the Commissioner may elect to exercise the powers of a commissioner under the 
Public Inquiries Act 1980, the equivalent of the Commissions oflnquiry Act 1908 (NZ). 
Section 20(3). 
Section 20(4). 
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(f) Include any other information that the Commissioner requires. 
Once the private disclosure statement has been filed the member, and the member's 
spouse if available, 48 are required to meet with the Commissioner to ensure that adequate 
disclosure has been made.49 Members have an ongoing obligation to advise of any material 
change.!>' 
Having received this information, the Commissioner is required to prepare a public 
disclosure statement on the basis of information provided by the member. The statement 
states the source and nature, but not the value of the income, assets and liabilities of the 
member. It also lists the names and addresses of all the persons who have an interest in 
those assets and liabilities, and identifies any contracts with the Government of Ontario. 
describing their subject matter and nature. Where a member of the Executive Council is 
concerned, the provisions are even more stringent.51 
Certain private interests are excluded, such as assets or liabilities worth less than 
$2,500, a principal residence and cash on hand.52 The Commissioner may also withhold 
information from the public disclosure statement if, in his or her opinion, the information 
is not relevant or a departure from the general principle of public disclosure is required.il 
There are very detailed provisions about enforcement. A member of the Assembly who 
has grounds to believe that another member has contravened the Act or Ontario 
Parliamentary convention (a term often referred to in the Act but not defined) may request 
the Commissioner to give an opinion as to the matter. 54 The request is to be in writing and 
set out the grounds of the belief and the contravention alleged. The request is then tabled 
and referred to the Commissioner by the Assembly or the Executive Council, whereupon 
the Commissioner may conduct an inquiry after giving reasonable notice to the member 
49 
Sl 
As defined in s I. It does not include a person from whom the member is separated. 
Section 20(3). 
Section 20(4). 
Section 2H3 ). 
Section 2](4). 
Section 21(5). 
See generally s 30. 
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whose conduct is the subject of investigation.s A copy of the Commissioner's opinion is 
given to the member whose conduct is concerned. 56 
The Commissioner need not conduct an inquiry where the matter is frivolous, 
vexatious or not requested in good faith or where there are no grounds or insufficient 
grounds.57 The Commissioner may recommend that no penalty be imposed, that the 
member be reprimanded, that the member's right to sit and vote in Assembly be 
suspended for a specified period or until a condition imposed by the Commissioner is 
fulfilled, or even that the member's seat be declared vacant."' 
The Assembly has an obligation, once it has received the report, to consider and 
respond to the report within 30 days. The Assembly may approve the recommendation 
and order the penalty be imposed, or reject the recommendation, in which case no penalty 
shall be imposed. The Assembly does not have the power to inquire further into the 
contravention, to impose a penalty if the Commissioner has recommended that none be 
imposed, or impose a penalty other than the one recommended. The Assembly's decision 
is final and conclusive."' 
An interesting question is whether or not a person in the position of the Commissioner 
can be the subject of an application for judicial review."' Recent authority from the English 
Court of Appeal would mdicate that a person in the position of the Commissioner should 
not be able to be judicially reviewed. In R v Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, ex 
parte AI Fayed, Mohammad AI Fayed sought leave to apply for judicial review in relation to 
a report by the House of Commons Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. 61 AI Fayed 
contended that Michael Howard, a former Secretary of State for Home Affairs as well as an 
MP, received a corrupt payment. 62 The Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards 
55 
AI 
61 
Inquiry of the Office of the Integrity Commissioner indicates that this power had not, at the time of writing, 
been exercised. 
See generally s 31. 
SectiOn 31(5). 
Section 34( l ). 
Section 34(5). Note also very importantly s 34(4)- Notwithstanding the powers contained ins 46 of the 
Legislative Assembly Act, the Assembly does not have power to inquire further into any contravention, to 
impose a penalty if the Commissioner has recommended that none be imposed, or to impose a penalty other 
than the one recommended by the Commissioner. 
Inquiry of the Office of the Integrity Commissioner indicates that such an application had not, at the time of 
writing, been brought. 
R 1· Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. Ex parte AI Fayed [ 1998] l AllER 93. 
Michael Howard is said to have been the worst Home Secretary in the history of that office - see I Gilmour 
and M Garnett Whate1·er Happened to the Tories (Fourth Estate. London 1997) 384. 
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concluded that Howard had no case to answer. AI Fayed applied for judicial review. In his 
submissions for AI Fayed, Pannick QC suggested that there were strong similarities 
between the position of a Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards and the 
Ombudsman. The Court having concluded that the Ombudsman was subject to judicial 
review, he submitted it would be inconsistent for the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Standards not to be subject to the supervision of the Court on an application for judicial 
review. 
The Court of Appeal disagreed. It recognised the similarity between the two officers 
but also saw a significant distinction which it regarded as critical: "' 
The activities of the Ombudsman are in relation to what I will call loosely the 
"administration"; they are not in relation to the activities of Parliament. The Ombudsman 
investigates the activities of government. Activities of government are the basic fare of judicial 
review. Activities of Parliament are not the basic fare of judicial review. 
The Court of Appeal said it was not concerned with what it was alleged Howard had 
done, but rather the nature and the role of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. 
What he was doing was directly related to what happened in Parliament. It was that which 
highlighted the distinction in the role between the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Standards and the Ombudsman. Whereas the Ombudsman was looking at what happens 
in relation to the administration by government: 60 
[t]he focus of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards ... is on the propriety of the 
workings and the activities of those engaged within Parliament. He is one of the means by 
which the Select Committee set up by the House carries out its functions, which are accepted 
to be part of the proceedings of the House. This being the role of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Standards, it would be inappropriate for this Court to use its supervisory 
powers to control what the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards does in relation to an 
investigation of this sort. The responsibility for supervising the Parliamentary Commissioner 
for Standards is placed by Parliament, through its Standing Orders, on the Committee of 
Standards and Privileges of the House, and it is for that body to perform that role and not the 
courts. 
Accordingly, any member of the general public aggrieved by the decision of a person in 
the position of the Integrity Commissioner or Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards 
would be required to complain to Parliament and not seek redress in the courts.65 
63 Above n 62, 96. 
Above n 62, 97. 
Presumably this would apply even if the Commissioner exercised his or her power to conduct a public 
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IV THE OTTAWA POSITION 
A different approach has been taken to the subject in Ottawa. In March 1996, the Senate 
and House of Commons adopted resolutions which included the following:"' 
That a special committee of the Senate and the House of Commons be appointed to develop & 
code of conduct to guide Senators and Members of the House m reconciling the1r official 
responsibilities with their personal interests, including their dealings with lobbyists; 
That the committee be directed to consult broadly and review the approaches taken with 
respect to these issues in Canada and in other jurisdictions with comparable systems of 
government. 
As in New Zealand, there were several existing provisions regarding conflicts of 
interest and conduct for parliamentarians. These rules were not consolidated in a single 
statute like in Ontario, but were found in the Parliament of Canada Act, the Criminal 
Code, the Rules of Senate, the Standing Orders of the House of Commons and the Conflict 
of Interest in Post Employment Code for Public Office Holders.67 The Joint Committee 
considered that many of these provisions were antiquated and dealt only with limited 
situations. It recognised that more up-to-date and relevant rules were required, both to 
guide politicians and to ensure the Canadian public that high standards of conduct 
applied."' 
The Joint Committee did not recommend a legislated code as in Ontario. They 
considered the best option to regulate the conduct of parliamentarians was to establish a 
code of official conduct which was non-legislated and self-imposed. 
The key features of the Code are first the creation of, a parliamentary officer, known as 
the Jurisconsult, who is appointed jointly by the Senate and the House.(;! Like the 
Commissioner in Ontario, this individual would be responsible for receiving disclosure 
from parliamentarians, preparing the public disclosure documents, advising 
parliamentarians on matters related to the code of official conduct, investigating 
complaints regarding conduct, and referring matters requiring an inquiry to the Joint 
Committee.~1 The second key feature of the Code is that the Jurisconsult would be under 
'" 
inquiry under the Public Inquiries Act 1980 . the Ontario equivalent of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. 
The Second Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons. 
[http://www. parl.gc .ca!committees352/sjcc/reports/02_1997 -03/sjcc-02-cov -e .html]. 
Above n 66. 
Above n 66. 
Above n 66, 10. 
Above n 66. 
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the direction of a new Joint Committee of the Senate and House on official conduce The 
Committee would have the authority to deal with all matters related to the Code and both 
the Senate and House would be responsible for determining any penalties for non-
compliance. Thus. the Jurisconsult would have much less independence from the House of 
Commons and Senate than the Commissioner in the Ontario Assembly. 72 The Jurisconsult's 
role would likely be limited to dealings with regular MPs rather than with Ministers, 
public officers and other Executive members. As with the Ontario Act, the Code contains 
detailed provisions requiring all parliamentarians to disclose confidentially their financial 
assets, liabilities, sources of income and positions.73 Senators and members of the House 
would also be required to disclose confidentially the financial affairs of their spouses and 
dependants and there would be detailed rules on the receipt of gifts and personal benefits; 
and rules regarding undue influence, insider information and parliamentarians furthering 
their private interests?4 
As with the Ontario legislation, there is recognition in the report of the special Joint 
Committee of the desirability of MPs maintaining a wide variety of activities outside 
Parliament to enable parliamentarians to reflect better the communities from which they 
come and to maintain expertise in their chosen fields. Thus there is nothing in the 
proposed Code which prevents a parliamentarian or a public office holder from engaging 
in employment or the practice of a profession, carrying on a business or being a director or 
partner, so long as the parliamentarian continues to be able to fulfil his or her obligations 
under the Code.75 
The Bloc Quebecois dissented from the Committee's majority report and complained 
about the fragmented piecemeal approach to the issue of parliamentary ethics. It said that 
only a global approach dealing with all issues would be satisfactory, and was particularly 
critical that the proposed code of conduct was not associated with legislation on the 
democratic funding of political parties or on the need for the reform of the Lobbyists 
Registration Act.76 
71 
72 
73 
74 
Above n 66. 
He or she may be removed at any time on a joint resolution of the House and the Senate. 
Code of Official Conduct, Ottawa, 8. 
Above n 73. 
Above n 66, 4. 
Above n 73, dissenting report, I. 
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V THE ENGLISH POSITION 
On 24 July 1996 the House of Comrri.ons approved a code of conduct together with a 
guide to the rules relating to the conduct of its members.77 The purpose of the code was 
said to be to assist members in the discharge of their obligations to the House of Commons, 
their constituents and the public at large.78 The code itself is not a long document, and is 
supplemented by the guide which is designed to assist members to discharge the duties 
placed upon them by the code. There are two key parts to the code of conduct. The first 
part emphasises the duty members have to act in the interests of the nation as a whole; and 
a special duty to their constituents.79 The second part of the code addresses issues of 
personal conduct and emphasises that members are required to base their conduct on a 
consideration of the public interest, avoid conflict of interest situations, and conduct 
themselves at all times in a manner which will strengthen the public's confidence in 
Parliament. Accordingly, no member shall, for example, act as a paid advocate in any 
proceeding of the House and will be required to comply with the requirements of the 
House in respect of registration of interests.00 The main purpose of the register of members' 
interests is "to provide information of any pecuniary interest or other material benefit 
which a member receives which might reasonably be thought by others to influence his or 
her actions, speeches or votes in Parliament, or actions taken in his or her capacity as a 
Member of Parliament". There are 10 categories of registrable interests: 81 
• Remunerated directorships in public and private companies; 
• Remunerated employment, office or profession which is remunerated or in which 
the member has any pecuniary interests. (This includes Lloyds memberships). 
• Any sponsorship prior to an election where, to the members' knowledge, the 
financial support in any case exceeded 25% of the election expenses, and other form 
of sponsorship or support as an MP which involves any personal payment, benefit 
or advantage. This category deals with sponsorship by companies, trade unions, 
and professional bodies. 
• 
77 
78 
81 
Gifts, benefits and hospitality . 
The Code of Conduct, together with The Guide to the Rules Relating to the Conduct of Members. approved 
by the House of Commons on 24 July 1996 Available at: [http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/palcm 199697/cmselect/cmstand/688/codefc.htm]. 
Above n 77,1. 
Above n 77. 
Above n 77, 2. 
Above n 77, I. 
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• Overseas visits where the cost was not wholly borne by the member or by United 
Kingdom public funds. 
• Overseas benefits and gifts. 
• Any land or property, other than any home used for the personal residential 
purposes of the MP or his or her spouse, which has a substantial value or from 
which a substantial income is derived. 
• Shareholdings (either personally, or with or on behalf of the MPs' spouse or 
dependent children). 
• Any relevant interest, not falling within one of the above categories, which 
nevertheless falls within the definition of the purpose of the register which is to 
"provide information of any pecuniary interest or other material benefit which a 
member receives which might reasonably be thought by others to influence his or 
her actions, speeches, or votes in Parliament, or actions taken in his or her capacity 
as a Member of Parliament," or which the member considers might be thought by 
others to influence his or her actions in a similar manner, even though the member 
receives no benefit. 
There are very clear rules prohibiting paid advocacy.81 The guideline states that it is 
wholly incompatible with the advocacy rule that any member should take payment for 
speaking in the House. Nor may a member, for payment. vote, ask a parliamentary 
question, table a motion, introduce a bill or table or move an amendment to a motion or 
bill or urge colleagues or Ministers to do so. 
Above n 7, Part 3 of the Guide. On 6 November 1995 the House of Commons had agreed to the following 
resolution relating to paid advocacy: 
It is inconsistent with the dignity of the House, with the duty of a member to his constituents, 
and with the maintenance of the privilege of freedom of speech, for any member of this House 
to enter into any contractual agreement with an outside body. controlling or limiting the 
member's complete independence and freedom of action in Parliament or stipulating that he 
shall act in any way as the representative of such outs1de body in relatiOn to any matters to be 
transacted m Parliament; the duty of a member bemg to his constituents and to the country as 
a whole, rather than to any particular section thereof; and that in particular no member of the 
House shall, in consideration of any remuneration, fee, payment or reward or benefit in kind. 
direct or indirect. which the member or any member of his or her family has received is 
receiving or expects to receive (i) advocate or initiate any cause or matter on behalf of any 
outside body or individual, or (ii) urge any other member of either House of Parliament, 
including Ministers. to do so, by means of any speech. question, motion, introduction of a bill 
or amendment to a motion or a bill. 
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Finally, a procedure is specified for complaints. 111 They are to be addressed in the first 
instance to the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. If the Commissioner is satisfied 
there is a prima facie case, he or she will ask the member to respond to the complaint and 
will then conduct a preliminary investigation. If it is found after some inquiry that there is 
no prima facie case, that conclusion will be reported to the Select Committee. If on the 
other hand, there is a prima facie case, the Committee will be advised of this fact. The 
Committee on Standards and Privileges has power to send for persons, papers and 
records; to order the attendance of any member before it; and to require that specific 
documents in the possession of a member relating to its inquiries or to the inquiries of the 
Commissioner be laid before it. The Committee will then make recommendations to the 
House on whether further action is required.81 
VI WHICH WAY FOR NEW ZEALAND? 
The tide of opinion appears to be running in favour of a code of conduct for MPs and 
rightly so. Because of the extraordinary number of allegations made about ethical 
standards in the last 12 months, it is essential for a positive step to be taken for the reasons 
given by Mr Ryall MP. The public is entitled to expect the highest standards from its MPs, 
and in many cases, it is not getting that. A self regulated code of conduct is inadequate. In 
1992, MPs were asked by a bipartisan group of their colleagues to sign a code of conduct 
aimed at restoring public respect. That code committed each MP, among other things:ffi 
• to conduct himself or herself at all times in the Chamber in a manner which will 
enhance public respect for Parliament; 
• to extend courtesy to other MPs and the public at all times within the precincts of 
Parliament; 
• 
• 
• 
• 
to exercise restraint in all references to persons outside the House, and in particular 
to respect any order made by a court restraining references to a person on a matter 
before the court; 
not to interject in an abusive or disruptive fashion; 
to behave courteously when asking questions of Ministers in the House; and 
to provide courteous and substantive Ministerial answers to questions . 
Above n 7, Part 4 of the Guide. 
Above n 77, para 73. 
"MPs asked to make a pledge on conduct", New Zealand Herald, 8 August 1992, 5. 
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Nothing further has been heard about the code of conduct although the sentiments 
expressed in it are very important and should be observed. Since the new MMP Parliament 
convened, there has been no mention of a similar code of conduct for the new MMP world. 
Unfortunately voluntary codes of this nature are dependent on the goodwill and 
enthusiasm of individual MPs and this is an insufficient basis upon which to raise 
standards in Parliament 
Any code should be incorporated in legislation. That part of the code which deals with 
disclosure of member's assets and liabilities should ideally be administered by an 
independent commissioner as in Ontario, appointed by the Governor-General in Council 
for a term of five years and should only be able to be removed on those grounds applicable 
to Judges of the High Court. Any code of conduct should also address the issues of 
conduct raised in the 17 point code referred to above and issues relating to the way in 
which an MP carries out his or her functions, including appearing on radio programmes 
and issues relating to travel expenses. 
One immediate response to this call for a code will be that it is all too difficult and one 
should rely on the good judgment of the individual parliamentarians concerned. As to the 
latter, recent experience has shown one cannot rely on individuals to behave properly. 
Laments about the difficulty of introducing such a code are reminiscent of the never 
ending debate within the New Zealand Council for Legal Education about the so-called 
difficulties of requiring law students to undertake a course in ethics and professional 
responsibility as a pre-requisite for admission to the Bar. After much debate, and over the 
objections (surprisingly) of several of the deans of the law faculties, the Council late last 
year resolved that ethics and professional responsibility will become a compulsory course 
for those wishing to be admitted to the Bar after 30 June 2000. A working group is now 
finalising the curriculum for the new course. Once a commitment is made, many of the 
supposed difficulties then evaporate. 
The change to MMP was supposed to herald a new and kinder Parliament. If anything, 
the institution is held in lower regard than ever. Putting aside the question about whether 
many MPs are competent and experienced enough to do the job, one must say there are 
real questions about whether some MPs know what is expected of them and whether they 
need the guidance of a code of conduct to help them improve their performance. It is also a 
source of some regret that, when considering a code, one must also consider once again 
questions about courtesy and exercising restraint in and around the House. Including such 
matters in a code of conduct may make the code seem pompous and even pious but certain 
incidents which have occurred in the last 12 months would indicate they are necessary. 
The Members' Integrity Act 1994 of Ontario provides excellent guidance on the way 
forward. and it is submitted that it is the model which should be adopted by New Zealand 
politicians who need to improve their performance in a number of respects and act with 
A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT? 
the integrity and courtesy which is expected of those who are privileged enough to serve 
in public life. 
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